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ABSTRACT 
The term coherence has been used to describe probability 
assignments and also actions of a decision maker. Here we describe 
a related concept of coherent preferences. Willingness to accept one 
side or either side of a bet are examples of preferences. A set of 
preferences is called (preference-reversal) incoherent if reversal of 
some subset results in a uniform increase in utility, as in the case 
of a sure win for a collection of bets. In both probability and 
statistical models (where preferences are conditional on data) we use 
"separating hyperplane" theorems to show that coherence implies 
existence of a probability measure from which the stated preferences 
could have been inferred. In one statistical model involving fairly 
general spaces, coherence implies existence of a finitely additive 
measure having this property. 
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-1. Introduction 
The term coherence has been used in probability and statistics in 
a number of senses. In a probability model where A denotes an event 
and x is the indicator function of A the payoff of a bet on A is 
k(x-p) where kp is the stake and p is a stated probability of A 
used in reckoning the betting odds. For a class of events Ai and 
corresponding values 
axioms, the values p. 
l. 
p., not necessarily obeying standard probability 
]. 
(or the corresponding odds) are called coherent 
(or fair or consistent) if no stakes exist which guarantee a sure win. 
For certain sets of events, coherence of the "probabilities" pi (or 
corresponding odds) implies that the pi values must satisfy the usual 
probability axioms ·( deFinetti ( 1937; 1949; 1964; 1972, Section 5.9), 
Shimony (1955), Kemeny (1955), Heath and Sudderth (1972)). 
Coherence has more recently been used in connection with statistical 
procedures. Cornfield (1969) refers to coherence of probabilities 
assigned to states of nature 8 after observing data x, that is 
posterior probabilities, or values playing the role of posterior probabilities. 
Here coherence of such values means that there are no stakes which give 
a positive expectation for every 9. This might perhaps be called a.sure 
win, but in fact it is a weaker guarantee than in the probability model 
because the expectation over x involved here guarantees a win in the 
long run, not on any individu~l trial. It was shown by Cornfield and 
independently by Freedman and Purves (1969) that in finite models coherence 
of posterior "probabilities" assigned to all possible outcomes implies their 
agreement with values calculated by Bayes theorem for some prior distribution. 
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Similar results of Quiring (1972) pertain to cases where probabilities 
are assigned only to some subsets of 0 values. For other extensions 
of the theory see Dawid and Stone (1972, 1973). 
Lindley (1971, p. 6) speaks of coherent actions: 
A decision maker whose actions agree with these axioms 
has variously been described as rational, consistent, 
or coherent. We shall use the last term because it 
effectively captures the idea that the basic principle 
behind the axioms is that our judgements should fit 
together or cohere. 
Summing up, we have cited examples of the study of coherent probability 
values and coherent odds both in probability models (deFinetti, Shimony, 
Kemeny, Heath and Sudderth) and in "statistical inference" models 
(Cornfield, Freedman and Purves, Quiring), and of coherent action or 
behavior, again in a statistical model (Lindley). 
The present report uses the term coherent in mathematical senses 
which are in much the same in spirit but different in emphasis. Instead 
of referring to probabilities or to odds or to actions, we speak here of 
coherent preferences. Both probability and statistical models are discussed, 
and results are obtained which are analogous to those mentioned above. 
A simple example may be helpful. Let B denote the event that horse 
Beetlebaum wins a certain race. From the extreme Bayesian point of view 
any person ca.n attach a unique subjective value to P(B) whether or not 
he knows anything about horse racing in general or Beetlebaum in particular. 
There exist less extreme theories (Smith (1961), Dempster (1968)) involving 
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upper and lower probabilities. Suppose our subject, Peter, believes 
p = P(B) lies in the range 1/4 < p < 3/4, but don't know where. 
Let (a,~) denote a bet which pays ~ if B occurs and a otherwise. 
Peter would presumably accept bets (4, -1), (-1, 4) but would reject bets 
(2, -1), (-1, 2), since the former have positive expectation for all 
1/4 < p < 3/4 but the latter do not. From our present point of view 
Peter would not be faulted for any of the individual choices mentioned 
ab~ve. But if the bets (2, -1), (-1, 2) were offered simultaneously we 
would say his preferences for (0, 0) (that is, no bet) over (2, -1) and 
for ~O, 0) over (-1, 2) are incoherent because by reversing both choices 
he has a sure win of +1 no matter who wins the race. 
As defined in this report, ("preference reversal" or.PR) incoherence 
of a set of preferences means existence of a subset whose simultaneous 
reversal guarantees a higher utility for every outcome. For a number of 
probability models it is shown that coherence of preferences is equivalent 
to an ordering consistent with expected values calculated from some 
probability measure. In the statistical model similar results imply 
agreement with Bayesian preferences for some prior distribution. 
2. Relationships between bets and preferences 
Let (a,-~) denote a prospect which gives a if A occurs and -~ 
if the complement A occurs, and let c be a positive scalar. The 
preference c(a,-~) > (0,0) is equivalent to willingness of the subject, 
Peter, to bet~ A (accept Paul's bet against A) with odds corresponding 
to the probability P(A) =~/(a+~). Peter's willingness to bet either for 
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or against A would be represented by the pairs of preferences {a,-~)> 
(0,0) and {-a,~)> (0,0). This pair might be replaced indifference 
statements: Peter is indifferent between {a,-~) and (0,0), denoted by 
(a,-~) ~ (0,0), or equivalently by (a,-~) ;::: (-ct',~). Our intuition may be 
aided by thinking of this indiffer~nce as corresponding to P(A) =~/(a+~) and 
~he preference (a,-~)> (0,0) as corresponding to P(A) ~~/(a+~). 
In finite spaces coherence problems can be thought of geometrically. 
Any bet or preference limits probability vectors to a subset of a simplex. 
A combination of bets or preferences is incoherent if the intersection of 
the corresponding subsets is empty. 
Now consider a case having three exclusive and exhaustive outcomes 
Let us say a simple bet is one which wins a. 
J. 
if A. occurs 
l. 
and loses ~- if A. occurs. We ask whether a preference such as 
l. J. 
(a1, a2 , -~) > (0,0,0) is equivalent to willingness to accept some 
combination of simple bets. Since the stated preference corresponds to 
a probability vector (p1 , p2 , p3) satisfying a 1p1 + a 2p2 - ~p3 ~ 0 and 
since the hyperplane boundary in p-space cannot in general be duplicated 
by intersection of regions based on simple bets, we conclude that the 
present models involving preferences are more general than models based on 
simple bets. For this reason the {finite space) results given in Section 
5 would not follow either from those of Freedman and Purves {1969) or 
Cornfield {1969) or Quiring (1972, Chapter II). 
The betting viewpoint could indeed be extended to include "compound" 
bets having three or more unequal payoffs. However, the conceptual 
formulation in terms of preferences rather than bets seems preferable for 
the present report. 
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3. Mathematical Preliminaries 
Our ma.in tools are familiar "separating hyperplane" theorems of 
linear algebra and their extensions. This type of argument has 
previously been used on similar problems by Freedman and Purves (1969), 
Heath and Sudderth (1972), Quiring (1972), Dawid and Stone (1972), and 
Pierce ( 1973). We state three lennnas for future reference. 
Definition 1. For any vector w = ( w 1, ••• , w r )' we wi 11 write 
w ~o if w is non-negative, that is w. :2:: 0 all i, 
l. 
w >O if w is positive, that is w. 
l. 
>0 all i, 
w :=::: 0 if w is semi-positive, that is w~O and w; o. 
The first lennna is given for example by Gale ( 1960), Theorem 2. 10. 
The bracketed part is a variation used only incidentally in the present 
report. 
Lemma. 1. Let M be an m-by-n matrix. Exactly one of the following 
alternatives holds: (i) there exists an n-by-1 vector v ~ 0 such that 
Mv >0 [Mv ~ OJ, or (ii) there exists an m-by-1 vector w ~ 0 [w >0] 
such that 
, 
-w M ~ O. 
In applications of Lennna 1, the columns of M are utility vectors 
(called prospects); w is a probability vector in Rm corresponding to a 
sample space of m outcomes; v gives a weighted combination of the n 
columns of M. Let s = l, ••• ,m label the rows and t = l, ••• ,n the 
columns. In generalizations either s or t take infinitely many values. 
Lennna 2 is a variant of the Lemma of the same number in Pierce (1973). Our 
proof is more elementary in not requiring the theory of duality of L p spaces. 
Lennna 2. Let (T, B, A) be a a-finite measure space and let 11 and 
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-L= denote respectively A-integrable and bounded functions on T. If 
Ms(t) e L1 for s = l, ••• ,m, then exactly one of the following alternatives 
holds: (i) there exists v(t) e L=, v(t) ~ 0 for all t, such that 
(3.l) fv(t) Ms(t) dA >O for all s = l, ••• ,m, 
or (ii) there exists a vector w = (w1, ••• ,wm)' ~ 0 such that 
Aftf EwM (t).>O} = O. 
s s 
Proof. We define a convex cone in m-space by C = {(a1, ••• ,am)1 
a = Jv(t) M (t) dA, v(t) ~ O, v(t) e L }. Let Q denote the positive 
s s = 
orthant of vectors~ O. If (i) holds, then C n Q F ~- Assume (i) is 
false so that C n Q = ~- Then there exists a separating hyperplane, 
whose normal direction we call w, such that w'q ~ 0 for all q e Q 
(implying w ~ Q) and w'c ~ 0 for all c e c. The last inequality is 
equivalent to 
(3.2) Jv( t) ~ w M ( t) dA ~ 0 s s for all v(t) e L, v(t) ~ O. = 
Define s e = ( t f "Ei w M ( t) > e }, w . s s 
function of Se. Then 
w 
(3.3) 
so = 
w 
lim 
€ ... 0 
Se , and v (t) = indicator 
TT € 
so that A(Se) = 0 and A(s0 ) = lim A(Se) = 0. Thus when (i) is false 
w w w 
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(ii) is true, and it is straightforward to show that (i) and (ii) cannot 
both be true. 
In Lennna 3 both s and t range over arbitrary spaces. Lemma 3 is 
a restatement in the present notation of Theorem 1' of Heath and Sudderth 
(1973). (Theorem 1' is a strengthening of Theorem 1 of Heath and Sudderth 
(1972) in which 
n 
n 
11 ~ c.ft (s) >0 
i=l 1 i 
for all s e S" is replaced by 
"inf .6 c.f (s) > O" and "or both" is replaced by "but not both." 
seS i=l 1 ti 
Lennna 3. Let S and T be sets and let {Mt(s): t e T} be a 
family of bounded, real-valued functions defined on s. Exactly one of the 
following alternatives holds: (i) there exist t 1 , ••• ,tn_e T and v1 
~ o, ... ,vn ~ 0 such that 
(3.4) 
n 
inf r; v .Mt. ( s) > 0, 
ses i=l J j 
or (ii) there exists a finitely additive probability P on S such that 
(3.5) for all t e T. 
4. Probability Models 
We begin with a space S of points s to be thought of as a 
space of simple (or elementary) outcomes. For the moment we avoid the 
assumption of any probability measure. 
Definition 2. A prospect g(s) is a bounded real valued function 
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defined on s. It is to be considered as reward of g(s) given to our 
subject, Peter, when outcome s is observed. In the subsequent calculations 
it will be seen that· values of g are handled like utilities, but we do 
not require an explicit assumption of this in our treatment. 
Definition 3. g' > g means Peter prefers , g to g, that is, given 
a choice of the two, he would take , g 
considered to be included; the choice of 
indifference). 
(the case of indifference is 
, 
g being consistent with 
In usual utility theoretic frameworks g' > g would be equivalent 
to h = g' - g > O, that is, a reward of g'(s) - g(s) if s occurs 
is preferred to no reward at all. Further h > 0 would be equivalent to 
A,h > O where A is any positive constant. For O < A <. 1 this is of 
course like saying g' > g if and only if any mixed prospect of the form 
"g' with probability A and g with probability 1 - A" is preferred to 
g. These assertions are not given the status of axioms here but are included 
to motivate defi.nitions of coherence. 
4.1. Finite Models 
Definition.4. Let g; > gt be a set of preferences for t = l, ••• ,n. 
For a finite space S = (1, ••• ,m} this set is called preference-reversal-
(or PR-) incoherent if there exist v1 ~ O, ••• ,vn ~ 0 such that 
n 
( 4.1) ~ Vt ( g/ S) - g; ( S)) > 0 
t=l 
for s = l, ••• ,m. 
Here and in the sequel preferences which are not PR-incoherent are 
called PR-coherent. 
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-It is clear that the t values for which vt ~ 0 single out a 
set of preferences such that a weighted combination violates the stated 
preferences uniformly in the outcomes s. 
Definition 5. A set of preferences , g > g, t = l, ••• ,n, 
t t 
is called 
w-coherent if there exists a probability vector w1 , ••• ,wm such that 
m m 
( 4.2) ~ w g'(s) ~ ~ wsg/s) 
s=l s t s=l 
for t = 1, ••• ,n. 
Theorem 1. Preferences are PR-coherent if and only if they are w-
coherent for some w. 
Proof. Apply Lemma 1 with Mst = gt(s) - g;(s). 
Since Definitions 4 and 5 are equivalent we can drop the prefixes PR 
and w and speak simply of coherent preferences. 
Example 1. Let g' - g = h, h1 = (1, -2, o), h2 = (-2, 1, o). t t t Then 
-h1 - h2 = (1, 1, 0) so that a reversal of preferences improves Peter's 
lot for s = 1,2 and leaves it unchanged for s = 3. The improvement is 
not uniform in s, and the preferences are in fact coherent. A unique w 
gives a consistent ordering: w = (0, 0, 1) '. It would be possible to 
formulate an alternative theory in which the above h1 and h2 might be 
called weakly incoherent, the negation, say strong coherence, would 
correspond to the existence of w >0 (i.e.' w >0, all s) giving a s 
consistent ordering. The bracketed version of Lemma 1 would be relevant 
to this formulation. The distinction is essentially the same as that 
between "fair" and "strictly fair" in the sense of Shimony (1955) and 
Kemeny (1955), and between "strict" and "weak" coherence of Quiring (1972, 
- 9 -
-· 
Chapter II). DeFinetti (1972, p. 91) favors the (weak) coherence of our 
definitions 4 and 5. 
4.2. Infinite Models 
Suppose s = 1, ••• ,m, t e T, where (T, B, A) is a measure space. 
Then ht(s)·- g;(s) - gt(s) > 0 represents an infinity of preferences 
involving a finite number of alternatives. PR-incoherence can be defined 
as the existence of a bounded A-measurable function v(t) ~ O such that 
Jv(t)ht(s) dA < 0 for all s, and w-coherence means existence of a 
probability vector w such that ~ w
8
h/s) ~ 0 a.e. (A). Lemma 2 shows 
that PR-coherence is equivalent tow-coherence for some w. 
Finally, we may let s and t range over arbitrary spaces S and T. 
Define preferences ht(s) = g;(s) gt(s) > O, t e T, to be PR-incoherent 
if there exist t 1, ••• ,tn e T, v1 ~ o, ... ,vn ~ O, such that 
( 4.3) 
n 
sup 6 v.ht (s) < 0, 
seS i=l J. i 
and define them to be w-coherent if there exists a finitely additive 
probability measure w such that ,fht(s) d w ~ 0 for all t e T. Then 
Lennna 3 implies equivalence of PR-coherence and w-coherence for some w. 
Example 2. If w = (1/2, 1/4, 1/8, ••• ), h1 = (-1, +3, 0, ••• ), 
h2 = ( 0, -1, +3, O, ••• ) , 
strictly preferred to 0. 
etc., then Eh. >0, so that each h is 
J 
Nevertheless h1 + 4h2 + 42h3 + .•• is 
strictly negative. This shows that an infinite combination of fair bets 
can be unfair (at least when stakes are unbounded). Thus any theory of 
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-· 
coherence would seem to need either bounded stakes or finite combinations. 
Example 3. Let S = T = {l, 2, ... }, h1(1) = 1, ht(l) = 0 for 
t = 2, 3, ••• The preferences are coherent because no positive 
combination gives a negative reward when s = 1. A probability vector 
consistent with these preferences is (1, 0, 0, ••• ). 
Example 4. h1 = (-1, 2, 0, ••• ), h2 = (0, -1, 2, 0, ••• ), etc. 
For a combination c1h1 + c2h2 + to be strictly negative we would 
need c1 >0, -2c1 + c2 >0, -2c2 + c3 >0, etc. No finite number of 
strictly positive c. will suffice so that the preferences are PR-coherent. 
J 
Any probability vector with Pj+l ~ \ pj gives preferences which agree. 
Example 5. h1 = (-2, 1, 0, ••• ), h2 = (0, -2, 1, 0, ••• ), etc. 
The same argument shows the preferences h > 0 are coherent. Here 
s 
however the probability measure must attach zero probability to each 
individual outcome and so be only finitely, not countably additive. 
5. Statistical Models 
In the statistical model the set S of outcomes s is replaced by 
a set ® of parameter values e. A new ingredient is the sample space X 
having points x. In the present report we restrict X to be countable. 
The function p(x;8) denotes the likelihood, that is a probability law: 
P(X = xle) = p(x;e); Lx p(x;e) = 1 for each e. A prospect now is a 
reward to Peter of g(e) when 8 is the true parameter value. Preferences 
are made conditional on observed data x; that is, Peter expresses his 
preference for g or g' only after observing x. We write h(x,8) for 
g'(e) - g(0) when g' > g given x. A set of preferences then indexed 
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1111111. 
by t e T is a set of functions ht(e) depending on x and e according 
to 
when x = xt 
(5.1) 
otherwise. 
For fixed 8 the expectation of ht(x,8) with respect to x is 
( 5.2) 
5.1. Finite T and ® 
Suppose 8 = l, ••• ,m, t = 1, ••• ,n. 
Definition 6. The set of preferences of the form (5.l) for 
t = l, ••• ,n is called PR-incoherent if there exist v1 ~ O, ••• ,vn ~ 0 
such that 
(5.3) for a= l, ... ,m. 
The interpretation is that preference reversal, with suitable weights, 
would increase the expected reward to Peter for every parameter value. 
For prior probability vector w = (w1, ••• ,wm)~ denote expectation with 
respect to w by 
( 5. 4) E cp( 8) 
w 
m 
= ~ w q,(8) 
e=1 a 
Then the marginal distribution of x is 
- 12 -
-· 
-
( 5. 5) 
the posterior density is 
( 5.6) 
and the posterior expectation of ht(x,8) in (5.1) is 
( 5.7) E I h (x,8) 
w xt t 
We require a simple convention to cover the case where the 
denominator pw(x) in (5.6) and (5.7) is zero. If for some prefere·nce 
ht{x,8) > 0 where ht(x,e) is given by (5.l), p(x,e) and w8 are 
such that pw{xt) = 0, then since the preference in question has probability 
zero of being exercised, we define the posterior expectation of ht(x,e) 
by 
(5.8) if pw(xt) # 0 
if p (x ) = 0 
w t 
Definition 7. In the statistical model a set of preferences 
ht{x,8), t = 1, ••• ,n, is called w-coherent if there exists a (prior) 
probability vector w such that 
(5.9) EI ht(x,e) ~ O for t = 1, ••• ,n. 
w xt . 
- 13 -
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Theorem 2. A set of preferences (5.l) for t = 1, ••• ,n is PR-
coherent if and only if it _is w-coherent for some w. 
Proof. Assume w-coherence for some w. Define U(x) = (efp(x,8) 
> o}. Then P (x ) = O 
w t 
implies U(xt) = Ut' say has prior (or w) 
probability zero. Note that 
( 5.10) E f (8) 
w t = ( ~ + ~ } ht(xt'e) p{xt'e) we· 
eeut eiut 
If p {x) ~ O we have by (5.8) and (5.9), E ft(e) ~ O. If p {x) = 0 
w t w w t 
then the first summation in (5.10) is zero because Ut has prior 
probability zero and the second is zero because p{xt,0) = O. Therefore 
E f (0) = 0 in this case, and we can apply Lemma 1 with M = -ft(s). 
wt st 
Countrariwise, PR-coherence, or nonexistence of the v vector implies 
existence of w such that E f (8) ~ 0 for all t. By (5.8) this 
w t 
implies Ewlx ht(x,e) ~ o 
t 
for all 
We note some special cases. 
t, that is, w-coherence. 
If all xt were the same, say xt = xO for all t, then one could 
alternatively appeal to Theorem 1 to argue that PR-coherence implies 
existence of a conditional probability, given xO, consistent with the 
preferences. Dividing this by the likelihood p(xO,e) and normalizing 
gives a prior measure known to exist by Theorem 2. We emphasize that 
in Theorem 1 we may have multiple preferences for some x values while 
for others there may be none at all. 
The case studied by Cornfield {1969) and Freedman and Purves {1969), 
wherein Peter states odds for every subset of 8 values given every x, 
- 14 -
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corresponds to preferences ht(xt'e) > 0 and -ht(xt'8) > O where for 
each. t, ht(xt,0) takes only two values (whose ratio is determined by 
the odds) as a function of 8. The above authors show that this large 
set of preferences makes the prior measure unique. 
5.2. Some cases where T and ® are not both finite 
In extending the model of Section 5.1 we continue to restrict l to 
be a countable space to avoid difficulties in defining conditional 
distributions. 
Lemma 2 is relevant to the case where ® remains finite but T does 
not. Rather than take (T, B, A) to be an arbitrary measure space for 
simplicity, we take T = (1, 2, ••• } and A= counting measure. Then 
Lennna 2 asserts that either there exist w1 ~ O, ••• ,wm ~ 0 such that 
m 
~ w M (t) s 0 
s=l s s 
for t = 1,2, ••• , 
or there exist v1 ~ O, v2 ~ 0, ••• , such that 
(5.12) 
co 
~ v M (t) > 0 
t::::1 t s 
for s = l, ••• ,m. 
Definitions 6 and 7 can be extended by taking n ==,and Theorem 2 continues 
to hold by the same argument. 
Finally Lemma 3 applies to the case where the space ® is arbitrary. 
Let w be a finitely additive measure on ® and let E denote expectation 
w 
with respect to w. We define the posterior measure on ® by 
(5.13) w(delx) = (p(x,9)/p (x)) w(d9) 
w 
where P (x) 
w 
= E p(x,9). 
w 
- 15 -
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and denote posterior expectation by E I . wx Definition 7 is changed to 
allow w to be finitely additive and (5.9) holds for all t in an 
arbitrary set T. Definition 6 0£° PR-incoherence is altered to read: 
there exist t 1 , ••• ,tn e T, v1 ~ O, ••• ,vn ~ O such that 
n 
( 5.14) sup 6 vi f ( e) < o 
ee® i=l ti 
(the definition (5.2) of ft(e) is still used). Lenuna 3 then shows that 
PR-coherence is equivalent tow-coherence for some finitely additive w. 
Example 6. ® = {o, * 1, ~ 2, ••• }, p(x;e) = 1/2 if x = 9 ¼ 1 and 
= O otherwise. For a given x the structural probability distribution has 
0 
mass 1/2 at each of the two points x ~ 1 (Fraser, 1971).· Therefore when 
0 
XO is observed the structural probabilist is indifferent between h = X 
0 
( ••• O, +l, O, -1, O, ••• ) (where the middle zero· is in the X 
0 
position) 
and the zero vector. Are these preferences coherent in the present technical 
sense? Yes they are because any finite combination of necessity only involves 
a finite number of 9-values, and so the expectation of any finite combination 
cannot be positive for infinitely many 8-values. We conclude that the 
preferences agree with an ordering by a finitely additive prior distribution, 
and in fact any one which attaches probability zero to each e value will 
do. The betting scheme proposed by Buehler (1971) (related to Blackwell's 
(1951) work on admissiblity, as pointed out by Stone (1972)) corresponds 
to taking the finite linear combination H = -h1 - h2 - ••• for which 
EH= -1/2 for e = 0 or 1 and EH= 0 otherwise. This H fails for two 
reasons to demonstrate incoherence: (i) The linear combination is infinite 
ratler than finite, and (ii) sup EH= 0 rather than< O. The remarks on 
a 
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"strong" and "weak" coherence made in Example 1, Section 4.1, are relevant 
here; the present example is seen to demonstrate a kind of "weak" 
incoherence. 
5.3. Replacing the probability law of x by preferences 
Let ® and I be finite spaces. We now replace the pr~bability 
law p(x,8) by a set of preferences conditional on e. For example 
g' (x) > g (x) 
0 0 
could mean that given that e = e Peter prefers a 
0 
reward of g'(x) tog (x). A given probability function p(•, 8
0
) 
0 0 
would of course determine all such (conditional on 0) preferences. 
0 
A 
set of conditional preferences could be incoherent, or could determine a 
unique cpnditional probability law, or could be consistent with a number of 
probability laws. The preference g' > g 
0 0 
can be written h > 0 where 
(5.15) 
, \ g '(x) 
h=h{x,9) =~
0
° 
- g (x) 
0 
if e = e 
0 
otherwise 
Certain beliefs concerning the conditional probability law of x given 8 
can be represented by a set of preferences ht> 0, t e t 1 , where each 
is nonzero only when e • 
t 
Similarly as in the previous sections Peter can have conditional 
preferences given particular x values, for example, 
X = X. Putting 
0 
(5.16) h = h(x,8) 
~ k;(e) - k(e) 
= ( l 0 
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if X = X 
0 
otherwise 
k'(e) > k (e) 
0 0 
given 
'-. 
a set of preferences conditional of x is represented by ht> O, 
t e T2 , where each ht is nonzero only when x = xt. 
Definition 8. The conditional preferences (ht, t e T1 U T2} are 
called PR-incoherent if there exists v1 ~ O, ••• ,vn ~ O, t 1, ••• ,tn 
e T1 U T2 such that 
(5.17) ~ vi ht. (x,e) < 0 for all x, e. 
l. 
We remark that if there exist (x , e ) such that 
0 0 
t e Tl, x t= x for t 0 all t e T2, then ( 5.17) fails for 
so that the preferences are necessarily PR-coherent. 
Definition 9. Sets T2 ·of preferences 
et t= eo for all 
(x, e) = (x , e ) 
0 0 
h > 0 t conditional 
on e and x respectively are called n-p-coherent if there exists a 
prior measure n(e) and a likelihood p(x,0) such that 
(5.18) Exie ht(x,0) ~ o 
Eelx ht(x,8) ~ 0 
for all t e T1, and 
Zero values of n and p are not precluded, and in (5.18) the 
following conventions are to be understood: when n(0) = 0 and 
0 
et= 80 then Exfe ht(x,9) = O; when ~a rr(0) p(x0 ,9) = 0 and xt = 
x0 then Eefx ht(x,0) = o. 
Theorem 3. Conditional preferences are PR-coherent if and only if 
they are n-p-coherent for some prior n(e) and some likelihood p(x,e). 
Proof. If the preferences are PR-coherent then Lemma 1 implies 
the existence of w(x,9) ~ 0 (not identically zero) such that 
- 18 -
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(5.19) ~:E w(x,8) h (x,e) ~ o for all t e T1 U T2• X 8 t 
· We may assume w to be normalized to a probability measure on Ix®, 
and define rr(8) =~ w(x,8), p(x,8) = w(x,8)/rr(8) when the rr(e) ~ 0, 
X 
and p(x,e) is arbitrary when rr(8) = o. For t e T1, Exie ht(x,0) = 0 
unless 8 = et. When 9 = et and rr(9t) = O, then Exie ht(x,0) = 0 
be convention. When 0 = et and rr(0t) ~ 0 then 
Exie ht(x,8) -1 = (rr(et)) ~x ht(x,e) w(x,8) 
= 
-1 "" (rr(8t)) ~x L.Je ht(x,8) w(x,8) 
~ 0, by (5.19). 
The proof for t e T2 is similar, as is the converse. 
- 19 -
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